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11 Introduction
This paper considers a matching equilibrium where the aggregate economy is subject
to stochastic job-destruction shocks. Workers when laid o⁄ are entitled to unem-
ployment bene￿ts for a ￿xed term, say 6 months, after which they receive no further
bene￿ts from the government. Since Mortensen [1977] we know that such duration
dependent unemployment bene￿t schemes generate re-entitlement e⁄ects: becoming
re-employed implies the worker (eventually) requali￿es for full unemployment insur-
ance (UI). This paper considers the impact of such re-entitlement e⁄ects on hiring
incentives over a (stochastic) business cycle. We show that in a non-competitive
labour market, re-entitlement e⁄ects generate an intertemporal transfer from future
hiring ￿rms to current hiring ￿rms. Such transfers are employment stabilising over
the cycle - they imply a net hiring subsidy in recessions.
An important insight for our results is that in a non-competitive labour market,
the joint value of a worker-￿rm match is increasing in the level of UI bene￿ts. This
occurs because the UI system credibly raises the worker￿ s reservation wage when laid-
o⁄which subsequently forces the worker￿ s next employer to o⁄er a higher hiring wage.
By extracting more rents from an outside party (the next hiring ￿rm) the UI system
increases the joint value of a current match. The issue then is who enjoys those
additional rents? Clearly if the worker has all the bargaining power, those rents go
into the worker￿ s pocket and the current employer does not bene￿t. Less obviously,
those rents also go into the worker￿ s pocket if UI payments are constant with duration.
In that case increasing the level of UI payments is not unlike increasing the value of
leisure while unemployed. This automatically leads to higher negotiated wages and
all ￿rms are worse o⁄. But suppose instead UI payments are duration dependent - for
example suppose UI payments cease after 6 months unemployment. This introduces
re-entitlement e⁄ects - the unemployed worker whose UI entitlement has expired can
only become re-entitled to future UI through re-employment. Re-entitlement e⁄ects
allow the current hiring ￿rm to expropriate at least part of those third party rents.
2The mechanism is most easily understood by assuming ￿rms have all the bargain-
ing power and so hire unemployed workers at their reservation wage. In that case
unemployed workers never obtain any surplus from re-employment - each worker is
always just indi⁄erent to accepting a job o⁄er. Consider then an unemployed worker
whose UI entitlement has expired. By becoming employed, this worker becomes enti-
tled to UI in the future when laid o⁄. But the hiring ￿rm (who has all the bargaining
power) extracts those entitlement rents through a lower wage. Now consider what
happens when that worker is laid o⁄ at some future (random) date because of a job
destruction shock. UI entitlement implies a worker has a higher reservation wage
which forces a future hiring ￿rm to o⁄er a more generous wage (should the worker
get a job before his UI entitlement expires). But that surplus was fully extracted
by the original hiring ￿rm through a lower hiring wage. Thus re-entitlement e⁄ects
imply a transfer of rents from the (as yet unknown) future hiring ￿rm to current
hiring ￿rms.
Such re-entitlement e⁄ects do not necessarily reduce unemployment. When a ￿rm
hires a worker who is entitled to receive further UI, the higher wage that needs to
be o⁄ered is essentially a transfer to the worker￿ s previous employer. [That employer
paid a lower wage re￿ ecting this potential outcome]. Of course by becoming fully re-
entitled to UI in the future, the current ￿rm o⁄ers a lower wage re￿ ecting those future
rents. But discounting implies those expected future rents are valued less than the
current (average) loss and equilibrium may yield higher steady state unemployment.
Outside of steady state the analysis is more complicated. The paper identi￿es
this transfer e⁄ect using a standard equilibrium matching framework where ￿rms
are subject to idiosyncratic job destruction shocks which evolve stochastically over
time. In the Conclusion we provide a back-of-the-envelope calculation for the U.S.
economy which suggests that the net transfer to ￿rms hiring in recessions may be
as high as 6 weeks UI. This works out as a 1.5% wage subsidy. This is clearly not
a huge amount but being a targeted hiring subsidy it yields a signi￿cant stabilising
3e⁄ect on employment over the cycle. Simulations formally establish that a reduction
in the duration of UI (tied to a compensating increase in the level of bene￿ts so that
the budget balancing tax is held constant) implies a reduction both in the average
unemployment level and in the variance of unemployment over time.
The existing literature on duration dependent UI systems has several strands. The
optimal UI literature (e.g. Shavell and Weiss [1979], Hopenhayn and Nicolini [1997])
designs UI programs which insure employed workers against layo⁄risk. There are no
re-entitlement e⁄ects in those papers as they consider an individual looking for work
during a single spell of unemployment.
Using a sequential search framework Mortensen [1977] and van den Berg [1990]
ask how a duration dependent UI program a⁄ects reservation wages given an exoge-
nous distribution of wages. Those papers show that the re-entitlement e⁄ect reduces
reservation wages at long unemployment durations. Albrecht and Vroman [2005] ex-
tend that approach by instead supposing UI payments expire according to a Poisson
process (rather than after a deterministic period of time). This simpler framework
allows them to identify a steady state wage posting equilibrium. Equilibrium is
characterised by a two point wage distribution where workers whose UI payments
have expired have a lower reservation wage. As this reservation wage depends on
re-entitlement e⁄ects, re-entitlement e⁄ects lead to lower posted wages.
Perhaps the closest literature is the equilibrium matching literature with duration
dependent UI. This literature has two strands. Millard and Mortensen [1997], David-
son and Woodbury [1997], Fredriksson and Holmlund [2001], Cahuc and Lehmann
[2001], Coles [2005] suppose wages are determined by Nash bargaining where the
worker￿ s threatpoint is the value of being laid-o⁄. This bargaining approach much
simpli￿es the analysis as it implies all workers negotiate the same wage. Assuming
workers are strictly risk averse, these papers then consider the optimal (duration de-
pendent) UI program taking into account that the UI program distorts wages and
hence job creation rates by ￿rms. Note however that this Nash bargaining approach
4rules out any re-entitlement e⁄ects on wages - although unemployed workers whose
UI payments have expired have low reservation wages, they negotiate the same high
wage consistent with being fully entitled to receive UI.1 Perhaps Cahuc and Lehmann
[2001] provide the best motivation for this approach - they assume union wage bar-
gaining where wages are negotiated by insiders (whose threatpoint is the value of
being laid-o⁄) and new employees (outsiders) must be hired at the union wage. Coles
and Masters [2004,2005] instead assume hiring wages are determined by strategic
bargaining between the hiring ￿rm and the unemployed worker and so depend on the
worker￿ s remaining entitlement to further UI. The bargaining approach used here is
closely related. Coles and Masters [2005] show that for sensible parameter values,
UI payments around the one-year duration mark distort (average) hiring wages the
most. With the exception of Millard and Mortensen [1997], the above papers only
consider steady state and so do not identify the stabilisation mechanism identi￿ed in
this paper. Millard and Mortensen [1997] assume Nash bargaining which rules out
re-entitlement e⁄ects on wages.
Following Mortensen and Pissarides [1994] there is also a rapidly growing litera-
ture which describes equilibrium matching when the economy is subject to aggregate
productivity shocks. The aim of this literature is to determine whether this matching
approach can ￿t the business cycle data. Shimer [2005] argues that the standard
Nash bargaining approach implies wages are too procyclical. The resulting variation
of vacancies over the cycle is then too small. This occurs as the assumed worker
bargaining threatpoint - the value of being unemployed - moves a lot over the cycle.
Of course it is well known that di⁄erent bargaining games imply di⁄erent Nash bar-
gaining structures (e.g. Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky [1986]). For example if
search is costly and so while bargaining the worker does not search for outside oppor-
tunities (the worker expects to reach immediate agreement tomorrow and so there is
little gain to search), the worker￿ s equilibrium threatpoint while bargaining is simply
1but note that re-entitlement e⁄ects encourage greater search e⁄ort by the unemployed
5the value of leisure. This immediately implies wages move less over the cycle (e.g.
Hall and Milgrom [2005]). Our bargaining approach is closely related to this latter
approach - the unemployed worker￿ s threatpoint here is not the value of continued
search, it is the value of leisure augmented by additional UI payments received from
the government (if entitled). See Mortensen and Nagypal [2005] for a mini survey of
this rapidly burgeoning literature.
Finally it is worth pointing out that the wage e⁄ects considered here are not
unrelated to the on-the-job search approach (e.g. Postel-Vinay and Robin [2002a,b]
and Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin [2005]) and the investment literature (Acemoglu
[1997], Acemoglu and Pischke [1999]. In the on-the-job search approach, an employed
worker can obtain outside job o⁄ers which trigger Bertrand competition between his
current employer and the outside ￿rm. Such competition yields signi￿cant wage
increases. When hiring an unemployed worker, the hiring ￿rm o⁄ers a low starting
wage re￿ ecting these expected future wage gains. The same mechanism occurs here
where re-entitlement to UI implies the worker can extract more rents from the next
hiring ￿rm and so the current hiring ￿rm extracts those rents through o⁄ering a
lower wage. Acemoglu [1997] points out that with job destruction shocks, ex-post
wage bargaining implies the worker￿ s next employer will extract part of the rents
which accrue to general human capital investment. As that employer is not identi￿ed
at the time when training takes place, this market failure leads to too little training.
Our point is that a UI system generates the opposite transfer e⁄ect. Should the
worker be laid o⁄ in the future, then being entitled to receive UI payments increases
the worker￿ s reservation wage when next employed, and the worker extracts greater
rents from his next future employer.
62 The Model.
Time is continuous and has an in￿nite horizon. There is a continuum of identical
workers with mass normalized to one, and all workers are in￿nitely lived. Each
worker may be in one of two states, employed or unemployed, where Ut denotes the
measure of workers unemployed at time t: There is also a continuum of vacancies
with measure Vt which will be determined endogenously via a standard free entry
condition.
There are matching frictions where a matching function Mt = M(Ut;Vt) describes
the contact rate between the unemployed job seekers and the ￿rms holding vacancies.
M is strictly increasing in both arguments, continuous, concave and homogenous of
degree 1 with M(0;V ) = M(U;0) = 0 and MV(U;0) = 1 for U > 0: ￿t = Vt=Ut
denotes labor market tightness at time t. For dt arbitrarily small, the probability an









and m is a strictly increasing, concave function of ￿ with m(0) = 0;m0(0) = 1:
Similarly, the probability a vacancy is contacted by a searching worker over time














For simplicity, all are risk neutral and have the same discount rate r: If a worker is
employed at wage w; and employment is taxed at rate ￿ by the government, then the
employee receives utility wdt per instant dt; the ￿rm obtains net pro￿t (p￿w￿￿)dt
and ￿ dt is tax revenue collected per employed worker. Note, all ￿rms are equally
productive and p does not vary over time. There is no on-the-job search - a worker
must quit before searching for alternative employment.
There are idiosyncratic job destruction shocks, where each job is destroyed accord-
ing to an independent Poisson process with parameter ￿t > 0; where ￿t describes the
7aggregate rate of job destruction at time t: ￿t evolves according to an N-state Markov
process: ￿t can take one of N values ￿
i; where 0 < ￿
1 < ￿
2 < :: < ￿
N: Given ￿t = ￿
i;
￿t switches state according to a Poisson process with parameter ￿ > 0; whereupon
the new realized job destruction state is ￿
j with probability ￿j: Assume that when a
job is destroyed, the worker is laid o⁄ and becomes unemployed.
The unemployment insurance system (UI) is described by a bene￿t function b(:);
where b(s)dt describes the bene￿t paid over instant dt to a worker who has unem-
ployment duration s; and an employment tax ￿: Note, the bene￿t pro￿le b(:) and tax
rate ￿ do not vary over the cycle. More generally, these policy parameters could vary
with time and be conditioned on the state of the economy. Assuming the scheme
is ￿xed over the cycle, however, is empirically realistic and allows us to assess how
such schemes stabilize unemployment. b(:) is positive and non-increasing with du-
ration and a worker obtains ￿ ow value l > 0 while unemployed. Further assume
b(0) + l < p ￿ ￿ so that a gain to trade always exists and so (e¢ cient) bargaining
implies that any contact between a vacancy and an unemployed worker always results
in a match. Given b(:); the employment tax ￿ has to ensure (long run) budget bal-
ance; i.e. the expected discounted revenues from the employment tax must equal the
expected discounted bene￿ts paid. Hence, on average, ￿ describes a fair insurance
premium.2
Given that all jobs are equally likely to be destroyed, assume that the UI program
provides universal coverage - that each worker when laid-o⁄ through job destruction
returns to the pool of unemployed workers with duration s = 0: Real world systems
do not usually re-entitle workers to full coverage as soon as they get rehired. Both
duration and generosity of entitlement are usually a complicated function of the
worker￿ s recent labor market history (see OECD [2004]). But as the average duration
of employment is 4.5 years in the US (Cole and Rogerson [1999]), which is much longer
2A technical issue here is that recessions could last so long that debt repayment would exceed
the total output of the economy. One way to avoid this problem would be to sell the ￿nancing of
the scheme to an organization with deep pockets.
8than standard quali￿cation periods, this immediate re-entitlement assumption is not
unreasonable.3 Assume also that only workers who have been laid o⁄ are entitled to
receive UI payments - workers who quit receive nothing.
Let Ft(s) denote the proportion of unemployed workers at time t whose current
unemployment spell is no greater than s: As negotiated wages generally depend on
a worker￿ s unemployment duration s; the equilibrium rate of job creation at time t
depends on Ft: As the value of being unemployed depends on (future) job creation
rates, it will depend on how Ft evolves stochastically over time. Unfortunately Ft is
in￿nitely dimensional which makes the characterisation of equilibrium problematic.
Tractability requires assuming that either workers or ￿rms make take-it-or-leave-
it wage o⁄ers.4 As giving workers all the bargaining power is uninteresting (￿rms
never make any pro￿t and so never invest in vacancies), we assume ￿rms have all the
bargaining power. Li and Wright [1998] make the same simplifying assumption in
a non-steady-state money search equilibrium.5 As unmatched workers never obtain
any surplus through re-employment, worker value functions are trivial to compute.
Characterising equilibrium then reduces to characterising optimal vacancy creation
rates given ￿rms extract all surplus. A minor drawback of this simplifying assumption
is that workers are best o⁄ when just laid-o⁄, which is unrealistic. This outcome
3For a new entrant to the labor market, the longest quali￿cation period of employment for full
entitlement is 2 years (UK). Most systems provide at least partial coverage after much shorter
periods of contributions. Furthermore, most people getting hired are not new entrants. Most have
some history of employment within the qualifying period which speeds up their re-entitlement to
bene￿ts.
4The di¢ culty is that the joint value of the match depends on the value of the worker￿ s re-
entitlement to full UI coverage. In general this depends on re-employment rates when the worker
is laid-o⁄ (at some future random date). Those rates in a free entry vacancy creation equilibrium
depend on Ft(:) which is in￿nitely dimensional. Hence, in general, today￿ s negotiated wage depends
on how (in￿nitely dimensional) Ft is expected to evolve in the future. Giving ￿rms all the bargaining
power neatly sidesteps this issue.
5also see Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2005) which estimates a structural model of the French
labour market and ￿nds that for most occupations the ￿rm￿ s bargaining power is close to one.
9would not occur if workers had all the bargaining power - workers would then earn
wage w = p while employed and obtain l + b(s) < p while unemployed. We believe
our insights on re-entitlement e⁄ects are robust to giving workers positive bargaining
power - unfortunately we cannot demonstrate this formally. A di⁄erent potential
criticism of this result is that employed workers would renegotiate as the value of
being laid-o⁄exceeds the value of being employed. Such an argument however ignores
the relevant worker threatpoint when renegotiating. It is not typically the case that
a worker can claim UI payments while re-negotiating - the worker is on strike, not
laid-o⁄. Similarly if the worker threatens to quit if the wage is not renegotiated - a
worker is only entitled to UI payments if laid-o⁄. A property of our equilibrium is
that a worker is always better o⁄ remaining employed at the negotiated wage than
quitting into unemployment with no UI support (or going on strike). Indeed we need
to assume that when a ￿rm hires a worker, they write an enforceable contract which
states that the worker earns some ￿xed wage w until job destruction occurs. It is
interesting that this wage contract protects the worker￿ s interests. Speci￿cally the
￿rm would like to renegotiate ex-post, driving the wage down to the point where
the worker is indi⁄erent to quitting. The worker instead enforces the terms of the
contract.
Following Pissarides [2000] we assume a ￿rm must pay a ￿ ow cost adt > 0 per
instant dt > 0 to advertise a vacancy: If the ￿rm does not advertise, its contact
probability is zero. With free entry, the number of vacancies adjusts so that the
expected discounted value of advertising is zero.
3 Characterizing Equilibrium.
In general the relevant aggregate state variable at time t is ￿t = (Ut;Ft;￿t). Let
Vu(s;￿t) denote the value of being unemployed in state ￿t with unemployment du-
ration s ￿ 0: As ￿rms have all the bargaining power, a worker with unemployment
10duration s in state ￿t is hired with an employment contract which has value equal to
Vu(s;￿t). Hence the recursive Bellman equation describing Vu over arbitrarily small





[l + b(s)]dt + EtVu(s + dt;￿t+dt)
￿
;
where the worker obtains ￿ ow payo⁄ [l + b(s)]dt over the next instant, and obtains
payo⁄ Vu(s + dt;￿t+dt) from then on, regardless of whether the worker receives a job
o⁄er or not. The value of being unemployed is therefore the expected discounted
value of being unemployed forever. As by assumption UI payments are independent












is the worker￿ s option value of consuming his/her remaining UI entitlement at dura-
tion s. It is now straightforward to compute equilibrium.
3.1 Equilibrium Wage Formation
Consider the value of being employed on wage contract w in state ￿t: Should a job
destruction shock occur, the worker is laid o⁄ and obtains payo⁄ Vu(0) as described
above. As the wage paid is constant over time, the value of the worker￿ s employment
contract depends only on ￿t via the current job destruction rate ￿t: Let V i
e(w) denote













e (w) ￿ V
i
e(w)]
11where the worker obtains ￿ ow utility w while employed, is laid o⁄ at rate ￿
i in state






















Rearrange this equation for V i
e(w) in terms of V 1
e (w): Using that expression to substi-
tute out the V j
e (w) in the top equation and then solving for V 1
e implies the following.



























the solution above simpli￿es to the more recognizable form V i
e = (w + ￿
iVu(0))=(r +
￿
i). Stochastic job destruction rates, however, imply ￿
i
re￿ ects that with positive
probability the economy will switch to a di⁄erent job destruction state in the future.
Note the above implies ￿
1
> ￿
1; re￿ ecting that job destruction rates will be higher







As ￿rms have all the bargaining power, the negotiated wage is set where the
worker is indi⁄erent to accepting employment. Given a worker with unemployment




e(w) = Vu(s): (4)
Solving this equation using (1) and (3) implies the following.
Proposition 1. Equilibrium Wages
12Given unemployment duration s and job destruction state i; the equilibrium wage
agreement wi(s) is
w
i(s) = l + rB(s) ￿ ￿
i
[Vu(0) ￿ Vu(s)]: (5)
Equilibrium wages are composed of three terms: the wage compensates for fore-
gone leisure, the option value of foregone UI payments at the point of hire (appropri-
ately annuitised) and there is a wage deduction which takes into account the value
of becoming re-entitled to full UI coverage in the event of a future job destruction
shock. Section 4 discusses this wage equation in detail and the reader who is familiar
with the equilibrium matching approach (e.g. Pissarides [2000]) might skip to that
section. In the rest of this section we complete the description of equilibrium.
3.2 Equilibrium Vacancy Creation.
Let ￿i(w) denote the ￿rm￿ s expected discounted pro￿t with contracted wage w in job
destruction state i: As a free entry equilibrium implies the ￿rm makes zero pro￿t if
the job is destroyed, then standard arguments imply
r￿









Using the same method as before yields
￿
i(w) =





i implies ￿k(w) < ￿i(w); ￿lled jobs are less valuable in high
job destruction states.
Proposition 2. Equilibrium Job Creation.
In state ￿t with ￿t = ￿
i, free entry of vacancies implies equilibrium labor market









13Proof: Given ￿t = ￿
i and contact with an unemployed worker with unemployment
duration s; the ￿rm negotiates a labor contract with equilibrium wage wi(s) described
by Proposition 1. This generates expected discounted pro￿t ￿i(wi(s)): Given the
distribution of uncompleted spells of unemployment Ft; free entry of vacancies implies
the ￿ ow cost of creating a vacancy equals the expected gain through contacting a
currently unemployed job seeker, where m(￿)=￿ describes the instantaneous contact
rate given labor market tightness ￿:
Having described equilibrium wage formation and equilibrium market tightness,
the description of the equilibrium market dynamics ￿t is now straightforward.
3.3 Equilibrium Market Dynamics
Given ￿t; unemployment at time t evolves according to the di⁄erential equation
dUt
dt
= ￿t(1 ￿ Ut) ￿ m(￿t)Ut;
where the ￿rst term on the right hand side describes the in￿ ow of workers into un-
employment through job destruction, while the second describes the out￿ ow through
matching.
Given ￿t and for dt > 0 but arbitrarily small, the distribution of unemployment
spells Ft evolves according to
Ut+dtFt+dt(s) = [1 ￿ m(￿t)dt]UtFt(s ￿ dt) + ￿
idt[1 ￿ Ut] + o(dt)
where the left hand side describes the number of unemployed workers at date t + dt
with unemployment duration no greater than s; which equals the number unemployed
in the previous instant with duration no more than s ￿ dt and who failed to get a
job over that instant, plus those employed who lost their job and so entered the pool
of unemployed workers with duration s = 0: Taking the limit dt ! 0 and using the











14Given an initial distribution of unemployment spells, F0(s); initial level of unem-
ployment U0 and the Markov process describing ￿t; these two di⁄erential equations,
together with Proposition 2 describing ￿t; imply a ￿rst order Markov process for
￿t = fUt;Ft;￿tg:
Finally given the UI pro￿le b(:) and the initial state of the economy (U0;F0;￿0);
the employment tax rate ￿ has to achieve long run budget balance. Given the above













3.4 Existence of a Market Equilibrium.
When ￿
i = ￿ for all i and for a constant UI program b(s) = b for all s, it is straightfor-
ward to show that a steady state equilibrium exists if b is small enough. In fact Coles
and Masters [2004] establish that if one equilibrium exists, then generically there are
two. That paper identi￿es such equilibria by ￿rst ￿xing an arbitrary value for ￿ and
solving for steady state labour market tightness, denoted ￿
￿(￿); and unemployment




For La⁄er curve reasons, either budget balance is not possible (bene￿ts b are too high
to be fully funded) or there are two tax rates which achieve budget balance. Not
surprisingly the equilibria are Pareto rankable, where the equilibrium with the lower
tax rate and higher employment level is preferred.
The same existence argument applies to the stochastic structure described above.
For given bene￿t pro￿le b(:) and initial values U0;F0;￿0; ￿x an arbitrary tax rate ￿:
Equation (6) describes equilibrium pro￿ts ￿i which are continuous in ￿: Hence for
given ￿t; Propositions 1 and 2 imply that the aggregate vacancy creation decision,
which determines equilibrium labor market tightness ￿t; is continuous in ￿: Hence the
di⁄erential equations describing the evolution of Ut;Ft;￿t are continuous in ￿ and so
15given (U0;F0;￿0); the expected discounted tax returns and bene￿t payments are also
continuous in ￿: The La⁄er curve argument now goes through: ￿ = 0 implies zero
tax revenues, while ￿ = p ￿ l implies no vacancy creation. Hence the budget surplus
is hump-shaped in ￿; and typically there is either no tax rate which achieves budget
balance, or there will be at least two. Obviously the lowest tax rate which achieves
budget balance is preferred.
4 Discussion and Simulations
4.1 Intergenerational Transfer of Rents
A primary insight of this framework is that with non-competitive wage formation,
the UI system transfers rents from future employers to current matched ￿rm/worker
pairs. The point is made most readily in the steady state case (￿
i = ￿ for all i and ￿w
constant): In that case, Proposition 1 implies an unemployed worker with duration s
negotiates wage
w(s) = l + rB(s) ￿ ￿[Vu(0) ￿ Vu(s)]: (8)
The worker extracts rents B(s) re￿ ecting the worker￿ s option value of consuming
his/her remaining UI entitlement, while the ￿rm extracts the surplus attached to
becoming re-entitled to full UI coverage in the future.
It is useful to decompose Vu(0); which is the expected discounted lifetime utility






￿￿wx[l + b(x) + ￿wVu(x)]gdx:
where with probability e￿￿wx the worker remains unemployed at duration x and so
receives ￿ ow utility [l+b(x)]dx over the next instant; and with probability e￿￿wx￿wdx
￿nds work at that duration with expected payo⁄Ve = Vu(x).6 This expression decom-




= l + b(s) + ￿w[Ve ￿ Vu]
16poses Vu(0) into expected UI payments received from the government, and expected
rents extracted from the worker￿ s next employer.







where the integral term computes the expected discounted UI payments made to a



















which describes the expected rents extracted from the next employer by a laid-o⁄
worker. Using (10) and Vu(s) = l=r + B(s) in (8) now implies
w(s) = l ￿ ￿ + (r + ￿)B(s) ￿ ￿R;
which makes explicit the intergenerational transfer of rents across ￿rms. When hiring
a worker, who becomes re-entitled to full UI coverage, the ￿rm pays a lower wage
re￿ ecting the rents the worker will extract from his/her next employer in the event of
a job destruction shock (which occurs at rate ￿). The ￿rm, however, also has to pay
a wage premium to compensate the worker for his/her option value of continued UI
(which has value B(s) and is appropriately annuitised). Of course those rents were
appropriated by the worker￿ s previous employer. The UI system therefore implies
a transfer of rents from future hiring ￿rms to current hiring ￿rms. Also note that
where Ve(s) is the value of becoming employed at duration s: Hence
(r + ￿w)Vu ￿
dVu
ds
= l + b(s) + ￿wVe:
Integration using integrating factor e￿(r+￿w)s implies the form stated, where Ve(s) = Vu(s) when
￿rms have all the bargaining power.
17the worker pays the insurance tax ￿ (but is fully compensated by expected future UI
receipts when laid-o⁄).
Note that the joint value of the match is















which is directly proportional to R: By extracting more rents from a third party (the
worker￿ s next employer) the UI system increases the joint value of any given match.
Given these rent transfer e⁄ects, it is useful to consider how they a⁄ect the ex-
pected value of ￿lling a vacancy. As steady state implies unemployment spell distri-
















Note, r > 0 implies the UI system reduces the expected value of ￿lling a vacancy in
a steady state; the expected rents lost to new hires exceeds the (discounted) value of
extracting rents from the worker￿ s next employer. More generous UI payments leads,
in a steady state, to lower expected pro￿t per ￿lled vacancy and hence lower vacancy
creation rates and higher unemployment.
This result, however, needs to be interpreted with care as it ignores non-steady
state dynamics. For example, suppose the economy begins life with all workers un-
employed and none entitled to receive UI. As ￿rms have all the bargaining power,
these workers obtain no surplus by ￿nding work. Assuming the economy converges
to a steady state, then any rents lost by ￿rms in that steady state must have been
appropriated by previous employers. Hence outside of steady state, the UI scheme
allows the early hiring ￿rms to extract rents from later ￿rms. Such transfers imply
high initial vacancy creation rates and a more rapid decline in unemployment over
time. It is precisely this mechanism which stabilizes unemployment levels over the
cycle.
18Finally note that the rent extraction term, R =
R 1
0 e￿(r+￿w)x￿wB(x)dx; is strictly
increasing in the re-employment rate ￿w: To see this, note that ￿we￿￿ws is the density
function corresponding to the exponential distribution and that a lower ￿w implies
￿rst order stochastic dominance. As e￿rsB(s) is decreasing in s; then (11) implies
a lower ￿w yields a lower R: The intuition is that when laid o⁄, a lower ￿w implies
the worker expects to be unemployed longer and so expects a smaller remaining
entitlement B(:) at the point of hire. Further the longer duration implies those
rents are discounted more. This insight plays an important part in the simulations
that follow - ￿rms that hire in booms (characterized by high re-employment rates
and short unemployment spells) lose more rents to unemployed workers which, by
forward looking bargaining, are implicitly an employment subsidy paid to the worker￿ s
previous employer.
4.2 Employment Stabilization over the Cycle.
















by hiring a worker at time t in state i: Note, the ￿rm loses rents B(s) by hiring a
worker with unemployment duration s; but gains expected surplus ￿
i
Vu(0)￿￿ through
re-entitlement e⁄ects. The previous section established that in a steady state with
￿
i = ￿; discounting implies the the expected loss
R 1
0 B(s)dF(s) dominates the re-
entitlement e⁄ect. This is not necessarily the case outside of a steady state. In
particular the UI scheme raises the expected value of ￿lling a job in the recession if
(i) the currently unemployed have relatively long unemployment spells, i.e. dFt(s)
has more weight at long durations s: In that case, fewer rents are extracted by the
currently unemployed, and
(ii) hiring rates are expected to be higher in the future, so that future hiring ￿rms
bear more of the cost of providing the laid-o⁄ worker payo⁄ Vu(0).
19We now use a numerical simulation to establish formally that a duration dependent
UI system lowers both the mean and the variance of unemployment levels over the
cycle.
4.3 A Simulation.
Consider an economy whose welfare system is composed of two schemes: (i) a 6-month
UI scheme, which pays b(s) = bUI for unemployment durations s below 6 months,
and (ii) a UA (unemployment assistance) scheme which pays bUA to workers whose
UI entitlement has expired; i.e. when s exceeds 6 months. A pure UI scheme implies
bUA = 0; while a pure UA scheme (inde￿nite payments) implies bUA = bUI:
The aim is to consider how changing the composition of this welfare system (i.e.
changing bUI;bUA) a⁄ects labor market activity over the business cycle. Throughout,
we shall only consider compensated changes so that the ￿nancing tax rate ￿ is the
same in all simulated economies. Hence the di⁄erence in economic activity is not due
to changes in the implied employment tax rate.
We consider a two state case, N = 2; and ￿1 = ￿2 = 0:5: Assuming a Cobb-
Douglas matching function, so that m(￿) = A￿
￿; the chosen parameter values are
described in Table 1.7
7Although we provide some justi￿cation for the parameters chosen, this is not meant to be a
formal calibration exercise - assuming ￿rms have all the bargaining power rules out a more explicit
quantitative analysis.
20p match productivity 1
l ￿ ow value of leisure 0.2
a ￿ ow vacancy cost 100
r discount rate 0.000107
A matching scale parameter 0.0333
￿
elasticity of the matching rate with
respect to the measure of vacancies
0.5
￿
1 job-destruction rate in booms 0.000548
￿
2 job-destruction rate in recessions 0.000913
￿ arrival rate of regime shock 0.0044
Table 1: Structural Parameters
The structural parameters are based on a time unit of one day. The match pro-
ductivity is a normalization. The ￿ ow value of leisure is similar to numbers used
elsewhere (e.g. Millard and Mortensen [1997]). The ￿ ow vacancy cost is chosen to
generate reasonable average unemployment rates. It looks large because it has to
capture all the capitalization costs of job creation and any subsequent non-labor pro-
duction costs.8 The discount rate is based on the 4% per annum number standard
to the real business cycle literature. The matching elasticity and scale parameter are
within the range found from estimates of the matching function (e.g. Blanchard and
Diamond [1989]).
The job-destruction rates are based on an average job life of 5 years in booms and
3 years in recessions. This compares with the ￿gure obtained by Cole and Rogerson
8Some models of this type (e.g. Albrecht and Vroman [2005]) use a parameter to represent a ￿ ow
cost paid by the ￿rm for the duration of the job, ￿lled or vacant. Such an approach has the cosmetic
bene￿t of a more realistic parameter value in simulations. But when ￿rms have all the bargaining
power, so that wages are determined purely by worker-side factors, this has little qualitative e⁄ect
on the results.
21[1999] for the U.S. of 4.5 years. The value of ￿ [and ￿i = 0:5] implies their preferred
switching rate of 0.2 per quarter.
The baseline economy is a pure UA welfare system; i.e. bUA = bUI and the level
of payments is set where bUA = bUI = 0:2: With l = 0:2; this implies an equilibrium
wage of 0:4 and hence a replacement rate of 50% in the baseline economy. Simulations
￿nd that the employment tax rate ￿ required for expected long-run budget balance
is 0.018; i.e., 1.8% of total output.
Table 2 reports the simulation results. Each row describes a simulation with the
same initial values fU0;F0;￿0g but di⁄erent bUI and bUA: For each bUA; preliminary
simulations were run to ￿nd the corresponding value of bUI so that the budget bal-
ancing tax rate ￿ remained neutral at 0.018. Given each pair (bUI;bUA) and the same
initial values fU0;F0;￿0g; the results described are for a simulation which is iter-
ated over 100,000 days, the ￿rst 10,000 of which are dropped from the calculations
(to avoid initial value distortions). Each set of results is computed using the same
realized sequence of job destruction shocks:














0.20 0.20 0.400 8.67 1.83 6.69 1.24 6.69 1.56
0.23 0.15 0.352 7.99 1.72 6.75 1.28 6.75 1.58
0.26 0.10 0.303 7.42 1.62 6.79 1.31 6.78 1.59
0.28 0.05 0.254 6.92 1.54 6.83 1.34 6.83 1.61
0.30 0 0.206 6.50 1.46 6.86 1.36 6.86 1.62
Table 2: Unemployment, job creation and job destruction, T = 6 Months.
The top row of Table 2 describes the baseline economy with a pure UA scheme
(inde￿nite welfare payments) and a replacement rate of 50%. The bottom describes
22a pure UI scheme where all welfare payments cease after 6 months. The intervening
rows consider a 6 month UI scheme but with di⁄erent levels of UA support. All
require the same budget balancing tax rate ￿ = 0:018:
Column 4 describes how average unemployment varies across these welfare schemes
and demonstrates that the pure UA scheme implies a signi￿cant increase in average
unemployment. Column 3 shows why. wH(0) = wL(0) = w0 is the wage a recently
laid o⁄worker negotiates. Although no more costly to operate (the required ￿nancing
tax rate is the same), the pure UA scheme implies a large increase in the option value
of remaining unemployed and hence higher negotiated wages (see Coles and Masters
[2004] for a full discussion). Higher wages then lead to lower vacancy creation rates
and higher unemployment.
For these parameter values, the constant UI scheme implies an average expected
duration of unemployment of around 18 weeks (the U.K. in comparison has an average
of around 26), while the pure UI scheme implies an average duration of around 13
weeks (as in the U.S.). But note that to obtain the same balancing employment tax
rate, the value for bUI is necessarily high in the pure UI scheme (bUI = 0:3 in the
pure UI scheme, while bUA = bUI = 0:2 in the pure UA scheme).
As equilibrium employment levels are higher in the pure UI case, the assumed
job destruction process implies that the mean and variance of the number of jobs
destroyed per period is greatest in the pure UI scheme (see the Job Destruction
￿gures, columns 8 and 9 of Table 2). Ceteris paribus, this would imply the pure UI
system generates greater unemployment variance over the cycle. Column 5, however,
reveals that the pure UI system also yields a lower variance of unemployment. This is
due to the stabilization e⁄ects discussed above. In essence intergenerational transfers
due to re-entitlement e⁄ects subsidize job creation rates in recessions, and so prevent
unemployment becoming too high during extended periods of high job destruction,
while dampening the increase in employment during booms.
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Figure 1: Impulse response: Percent deviation of average hiring wage from its (un-
conditional) expected value.
wage negotiated by workers hired at any point in time changes as the economy moves
into recession. It has been constructed for the pure UI economy (bottom row) of
Table 2. Prior to time 0 the economy is in the conditional steady-state associated
with ￿ = ￿
L (a boom). At time 0, ￿ switches to ￿
H forever (though individuals in
the model continue to expect the job destruction state to switch at rate ￿:)
There is an initial downward jump in the average hiring wage at time 0; which
re￿ ects the increased value of becoming re-entitled to future UI (see Proposition
1). The wave of newly laid-o⁄ workers, however, causes a decrease in the average
uncompleted spell of unemployment. This feature of the data is well documented in
the long-term unemployment literature (e.g. Machin and Manning [1999]). In our
model, this fall in the average uncompleted spell leads, at least initially, to a spell of
rising wages. This initial composition e⁄ect washes out at around 9 months.
In the longer￿ term, the economy moves toward a conditional steady-state associ-
ated with high job destruction. Not surprisingly this generates higher unemployment
24levels and longer unemployment spells. But re-entitlement e⁄ects, which enable hir-
ing ￿rms to extract rents from the worker￿ s next future employer (potentially in a
future boom), imply unemployment is not so high as it otherwise would have been.
The overall e⁄ect is a reduction in the variance of unemployment over the cycle.
5 Conclusion
This paper has shown that when UI payments are duration dependent, re-entitlement
e⁄ects in a non-competitive economy generate transfers from ￿rms that hire in the
future to currently hiring ￿rms. Using an equilibrium matching framework, simula-
tions ￿nd that a switch from a pure UA system to a pure 6-month UI system lowers
both average unemployment and the variance of unemployment over the cycle.
A simple back-of-the-envelope calculation illustrates the potential magnitude of
this stabilisation e⁄ect. Suppose that the UI program stops payments after 26 weeks
of unemployment. Further suppose the business cycle is a two state phenomenon - the
economy is either in recession with an average duration of unemployment equal to 18
weeks, or in a boom with an average duration of 8 weeks where each state is equally
likely [i.e. the average spell is 13 weeks over the cycle]. In the recession, the mean
remaining UI entitlement of a currently unemployed worker is 12 weeks more UI.9
Re￿ ecting the worker￿ s option value of remaining unemployed, the (average hiring)
wage depends on the annuitised value of that remaining entitlement. But that hiring
wage also re￿ ects the worker￿ s re-entitlement to future UI. Suppose then that when
laid-o⁄in the future, that layo⁄occurs in a boom. With average unemployment spells
of 8 weeks in a boom, the mean remaining UI entitlement of a currently unemployed
worker is 18 weeks. Hiring ￿rms in booms o⁄er higher wages to compensate for
that entitlement, but those rents are essentially a transfer to the worker￿ s previous
employer. In this example, re-entitlement e⁄ects imply an average transfer of 18-12=6
9This is computed using
R 1
0 ￿we￿￿ws max[26 ￿ s;0]ds with ￿w = 1=18:
25weeks UI from ￿rms that hire in booms to ￿rms that hire in recessions. Assuming a
50% replacement rate and annuitising over an average employment spell of around 4
years (e.g. Cole and Rogerson [1999]) yields a 1.5% wage subsidy. This is not a huge
amount. Indeed the simulations show that average hiring wages do not move much
over the cycle - hiring wages in the conditional steady state with low job destruction
rates are only 1.2% higher than in the conditional steady state associated with high
job destruction rates. Indeed the average employee wage hardly changes over the
cycle. Nevertheless being a targeted hiring subsidy in recessions, simulations show
that these transfers are e⁄ective in stabilising employment levels over the cycle.
For ease of exposition the paper has assumed the business cycle is driven by
variations in job destruction rates (e.g. Davis and Haltiwanger [1992], Mortensen
and Pissarides [1994]). Shimer [2005] challenges this view of the cycle. As our back-
of-the-envelope calculation reveals, however, what is important for our argument
is that the average duration of unemployment is higher in recessions. Introducing
productivity shocks complicates our model as renegotiation constraints might bind;
e.g. the wage is renegotiated should productivity p < w: Of course when hiring, the
￿rm and worker anticipate such renegotiations and, as the ￿rm has all the bargaining
power, the starting wage adjusts so that the ￿rm still extracts all expected rents
(see Postel-Vinay and Robin [2002a,b] for related arguments). Although wages then
evolve stochastically during the lifetime of the job, the above insights continue to
hold: re-entitlement e⁄ects imply a net subsidy to ￿rms who hire in recessions.
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